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Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to start with a diagram of the crisis. The
left-hand side (see Figure 1) reveals the dispersion of
interest rates before the euro was introduced. After
the euro was introduced exchange rate uncertainty
disappeared and the interest rates converged. This
triggered a process of rapid economic growth
because cheap money was available to the southern
countries. On the right-hand side of the same figure
you can see how the interest rates have once again
spread significantly in the past few years, with Greece
paying the top rate and Germany the lowest rate (see
the red curve). By Wednesday the 28th of April 2010,
the interest rate for Greece had risen to 38 percent.
That was basically the day on which Greece went
bankrupt. 
What happened next? By 7 May 2010, a Friday one
week later, the interest premium had increased even
further, and on Saturday and Sunday the EU designed
its rescue package, basically obliterating the no-bail-
out clause of the Maastricht Treaty, because other-
wise, it was claimed, the world would fall apart. The
idea was that we had to be generous, that this would
be the solution, and that the markets would calm
down – which they did, but only for a while (until
1 June). The interest rate fell to 8 percent in Greece. 
Unfortunately, the rescue package simply did not
work. The situation now is more extreme than when
the EU designed the rescue package; and the world
still has not fallen apart, although we might be close
to this in a sense. We are in the midst of a crisis in
Europe. How the European countries react will have
implications for the new shape of Europe; a new
European entity will emerge out of this crisis, but we
do not really know what it will look like. 
What happens over the course of this year will be
decisive. The European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) in Luxembourg will have to be finalized by
the end of this year, as the European countries agreed.
And that will bring us a new Europe.
Role of the government
The role of the government can best be understood in
Musgrave’s terms of allocation,
distribution and stabilization,
which I will go into. I will also
talk about the public debt prob-
lem resulting from the crisis and
whether Europe will turn into a
transfer union or not.
Allocation
What economists mean by alloca-
tion is that the government pro-
vides goods that the private sec-
tor cannot produce, for example,
infrastructure. These are so-
called public goods, which are not
divisible, but are consumed com-
monly by the people and there-
fore cannot reasonably be provid-
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Figure 1ed privately. Today Europe has to provide some of
these goods in terms of cross-border traffic lines. A
broadband network, for example, could be a govern-
ment function. It is not too profitable; we don’t need
too many overlaying networks, and the government
has to subsidize it at least. 
Regulation is one of the government functions. The
market economy is not a system in which everyone
can do whatever they want. On the contrary, a market
economy is a game with clearly defined rules, and
these rules have to be made by the government.
Among the rules that obviously did not function were
those set out for the banking sector. The Basel system
failed miserably because it required far too little equi-
ty for risky assets like Greek government bonds. The
risk weights for government bonds were zero, and this
was one of the reasons why the banks invested so
heavily in government bonds and why so much capital
flowed into the southern European periphery, which
is now stuck in a crisis. 
Some people claim that, because we opened up the
borders within Europe, we now need minimum wages.
Economists do not see this sort of regulation as being
a government function. If high-wage countries seek to
protect their wages from immigration from Eastern
Europe with minimum wages, then immigration will
fuel unemployment in the domestic population. The
immigrants will come, take jobs, and drive their
domestic incumbents into unemployment. This is a
dangerous development, and yet some people in
Germany nevertheless would like to see the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage. Millions of people will
migrate within Europe over the next decade. Many of
those who moved to Spain – 6 million in the last
decade – are unemployed now. Those who went to
Ireland and Britain largely face the same fate.
However, this group represents a mobile stock of peo-
ple who have already decided to migrate, so they may
well now travel to other parts of Europe, where the
economy is booming. Minimum wages would be the
worst thing to implement. We need the migrants
urgently, but in order for immigration to be a success
story downward wage flexibility is necessary to gener-
ate jobs for the immigrants.
Opinions are divided about the role of firms run by the
government. Water provision is clearly a government
function because you cannot establish competition in
this sector. A comprehensive study of the success of
European privatization suggests that privatization
makes sense where you can establish competition
(Köthenbürger, Sinn and Whalley 2006). If there is no
competition, a regulator appears to be needed who,
however, can never be perfectly independent, but may
also be inclined to follow the preferences of the indus-
try. There are good examples of government firms
that have failed, such as the German state banks.
Conversely, there are private toll roads in Europe that
do not work, for example in Italy. Moreover, the pri-
vate railways in Britain were a nice idea in principle,
but are a catastrophe if you use the system. The
Thatcherite period is over, and we now have to rethink
and rebalance our approach with regard to excessive
privatization.
There is currently considerable discussion about green
energy, and the government wants to decide how the
market should provide the energy we need. I agree
fully that we need a post-Kyoto agreement in which all
countries participate, so as to control what Nicholas
Stern called “the greatest externality ever”, namely
global warming. But what countries are doing at the
moment is not exactly the right thing. We have feed-in
tariffs in addition to an emissions trading system.
This feed-in system is completely useless. It has no
impact on the aggregate CO2 output, since we already
have full control via the emissions trading system.
Feed-in tariffs in Germany not only lead to green
energy crowding-out, but also to an emigration of
emission certificates from Germany to other coun-
tries, allowing them to emit exactly as much addition-
al CO2 as Germany saves due to its feed-in tariffs.
Thus the feed-in tariffs exert a zero-point-zero effect
on CO2 output in Europe. They are simply a waste of
money. German electricity consumers spend 12 bil-
lion euros on feed-in tariffs, with 17 billion forecast
for next year and the figure rapidly projected to
exceed 20 billion euros. 
It is also not the function of the government to decide
to replace nuclear power with wind turbines. Given
that we have the emissions trading system, the market
can make this decision. Even if we replaced nuclear
power plants with fossil fuel plants, there would not
be any additional CO2 output as a result of the emis-
sions trading system. The market will find the optimal
allocation. Wind turbines will be erected in the places
best suited for them, like Brittany for example, where
there is a lot of wind, rather than in Germany. More  -
over, solar panels will be put up because the price of
emission certificates is being driven up, but not in
Germany where the sunshine is comparatively rare.
They will be set up in the Extremadura in Spain,
which is a much more efficient location.
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There are lots of useful things for governments to
do, as first described by the German economist
Adolf Wagner in the 19th century. According to
Wagner’s law, the government’s share of GDP grad-
ually increases with industrialization (see Figure 2).
Around 1900, the German government share of
GDP was around 10 percent, whereas it is now
approaching 50 percent. Even in Germany’s post-
war period, Wagner’s law can be observed very clear-
ly. There is a gradual increase of the government
share of GDP from 30 percent in 1950 to today’s
50 percent. Even the United States, which used to
have a low government share of GDP, is now
approaching the level of Germany and other
European countries. This is due to fiscal rescue oper-
ations and the stagnation of the US economy. When
I wrote my book on the Germany economy in 2003,
I observed that a few years earlier Britain had a gov-
ernment share of only 39 percent of GDP, while
Germany’s was 49 percent. However, all that has
now changed: Britain has a government share of
GDP of over 50 percent, while Germany’s share has
now been reduced to 47 percent. In Sweden – an
amazing development – the share decreased from
70 percent to about 54 percent. While France, with
56 percent – 9 percentage points more than Germany
– has now overtaken Sweden. Sweden is no longer
the primary example of a socialist state in Europe:
this role is now played by France. There is only one
country in Europe with a larger government share of
GDP: namely Denmark, with 59 percent. If one
thinks of a range between 0 and 100 and calls 0 a
pure market economy and 100 a pure communist
country, what are these countries closer to? 
Of course, pure communism has never existed. The
market always played some role in Communism.
Similarly, there has never been a pure market econo-
my; the government has always accounted for a share
of GDP.
Distribution
Another function of the government is distribution.
The government provides social security, which
Bismarck introduced in the 19th century to pacify the
left. The United States has finally realized that it
needs a mandatory health and pension insurance sys-
tem. Europe, on the other hand, certainly needs co-
funded pension systems. Since Europeans suffer from
a seriously low birth rate, they cannot simply rely on
their children to pay for them. Given that there are
too few children, pensions will be too meagre – unless
there are more savings. Granted, saving is not that
easy, considering that investments are very risky at the
moment. 
Taxation is also an important issue. Hidden progres-
sion is an on-going theme. Inflation and normal
growth automatically increase the government share
in GDP, which thus provides support for Wagner’s
law. It is not, however, appropriate for the government
to participate to a greater extent in economic growth
than the private sector. This is why the tax schedule
should be adjusted automatically every year. This is
an important reform that needs to be implemented.
The high marginal tax rates on labour are a big prob-
lem in Germany. The overall marginal tax rate on the
value-added produced by labour is two-thirds. For a
normal worker, two-thirds of
what s/he generates in value with
his own work is captured by the
state. Another important issue
that needs to be discussed is cap-
ital income taxation vs. consump-
tion taxation.
How we deal with tax-financed
social benefits is also important.
Germany and most other western
countries, for example, largely
rely on the idea of replacement
incomes – incomes which the
government provides if you don’t
have a job. This action turns the
government into a competitor in
the labour market, since the
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Figure 2under the condition that the recipients do not work is
a kind of minimum wage. The private sector will not
find workers unless companies pay as much as the
government. That was a huge drawback for Germany
until Chancellor Schröder introduced the Agenda
2010, which changed the system by reducing the
replacement incomes and abolishing the second tier of
the unemployment benefit system (Arbeitslosenhilfe).
There are now 1.5 million wage-subsidy recipients in
Germany. These are working people who receive addi-
tional money from the government. This is the idea
behind the so-called ‘activating’ of social assistance. 
Another topic to discuss is how we treat immigrants.
It is a sacred cow in Europe that we stick to the resi-
dence principle. If someone moves from one EU
country to another he receives the social benefits
according to the rules of his or her new country of
residence. But why aren’t such benefits based on the
country that he came from? After all, all EU countries
adhere to the EU’s social norms, and all have social
systems providing minimum income guarantees. Why
don’t we give every EU citizen the right, if he is poor,
to collect social welfare from the government and
consume it wherever he wants? When it comes to wel-
fare benefits, I think we should consider changing the
residence principle to the home-country principle,
because if we don’t, there will be competition between
the welfare states and erosion of welfare benefits. 
Stabilization
The third big function of the government is stabiliza-
tion. For a long period of time many people thought
this function was superfluous because the markets are
stable or governments would even destabilize the
economy further. But now the general opinion is that
governments might be useful after all. Only few econ-
omists denied the role of Keynesian demand manage-
ment at the peak of the crisis in 2008 and 2009. Thus,
there was general agreement that the one-trillion euro
debt incurred by governments around the world to
fight the crisis was justified. Incidentally, a further
4.9 trillion euros was granted as credit facilities for
banks. These were strong interventionist measures to
help the world recover more quickly from the most
severe recession of the post-war period. 
We economists are often blamed for not having pre-
dicted the crisis, but no one gives us credit for the
quick recovery from it. In fact, the actions taken dur-
ing the crisis were largely in line with the formula
described in most European textbooks on macroeco-
nomics: deficit spending. If we managed to recover so
quickly, instead of repeating what happened between
1929 and 1933, it was thanks to economists.
And now we have country bail-outs. The bank bail-
outs cost a lot of money. It was not that the 4.9 tril-
lion euros were completely spent; this was a facility
which, to a large extent, was not made use of and is
still available. That is one of the reasons why we do
not have to be afraid that another Lehman Brothers
will occur. These rescue facilities could easily be acti-
vated to prevent any systemically relevant bank from
failing. 
The country bail-outs provided liquidity, but they
have also been used to shore up solvency. This is not a
matter of semantics. A country can also be temporar-
ily unable to service its debt, so it has a financial prob-
lem and requires help. This does not mean, however,
that the financing of a country should continue forev-
er. Greece has an aggregate consumption level – gov-
ernment and private sector combined – that is 17 per-
cent higher than its aggregate income level – with
income here being defined as disposable income,
including transfers from the EU to Greece. If we con-
tinue to finance this level of consumption for a longer
period, we will not be providing liquidity help. This
will constitute help to maintain a living standard and
to prevent insolvency, even although the country is
effectively bankrupt. I said a year ago at this confer-
ence when Claude Trichet was sitting here in front of
me that Greece is insolvent; I repeat that now. The
longer we wait to acknowledge this fact, the more dif-
ficult the situation will become.
Public debt problem in detail
Let me now turn to the public debt problem. Milton
Friedman said that with every crisis – even minor ones
– government debt will continue to rise because of
deficit spending during the crisis, while the reverse
does not occur once the situation has improved.
Figure 3 shows how the public debt-to-GDP ratio has
evolved in Germany. It was 20 percent until 1970,
when Willy Brandt came to power. During his gov-
ernment, decisions were made that laid the foundation
for this enormous increase. Then came Helmut
Schmidt’s period, but he was just carrying out the
policies of the previous social-liberal coalition.
During this period, the German debt-to-GDP ratio
doubled from 20 to 40 percent. Now we are at the
record level of 83 percent. The curve is steeper than it
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has ever been in the history of Germany. Other coun-
tries are not doing much better. 
Figure 4 depicts the debt-to-GDP ratio for the OECD
countries at the end of 2010. The 60-percent Maas  -
tricht Treaty criterion was never taken seriously in
Europe: Greece’s ratio has soared to 143 percent,
Ireland’s to 96 percent and Portugal is about the same.
Spain, despite its huge labour problems, actually
looks fairly good. Looking at the deficit-to-GDP
ratios last year, we can see that the 3-percent line of
the Stability and Growth Pact was breached quite sig-
nificantly: Ireland had a deficit ratio of 32 percent
and Greece of 10.5 percent. Some claim that Greece is
now saving, because its deficit is
no longer 15 percent, as it was
last year. In fact, if you have a
deficit of 10.5 percent, you are
not saving: you are increasing
your debt. Spain and Portugal, in
turn, have a 9.2-percent deficit. 
In terms of debt-to-GDP, Italy is
at 119 percent, compared to the
United States at 93 percent,
which is rapidly approaching the
100 percent line. The similarity
between the southern European
countries and the United States is
rather striking. The origin of
their problems is also similar: the
United States was, and is, living
beyond its means, importing for-
eign capital to the tune of 5 per-
cent of GDP per year. If you add
that figure to the explosion in money supply, this is an
extremely dangerous situation. The United States
cannot continue in this vein year after year. Italy was
a relatively good performer throughout the crisis but
is now under pressure, and Germany, with 3.3 percent
growth, looks good, but I will come back to that later.
The violations of the 3-percent limit are not new.
Since the euro system was established, there have been
96 cases of a country exceeding the 3-percent deficit
limit. In some cases this was allowed because of a
recession, but even allowing for these exceptions, there
were still 67 cases of breaches of the 3-percent rule.
According to the original formu-
lation of the pact, some sort of
sanction should have been
applied. In reality, no sanction
was ever levied. This is not sur-
prising. The ‘sinners’ and the
‘judges’ were one and the same:
the judges were the Ecofin
Council, and the sinners the
finance ministers of Europe,
members of the same council. A
system of self-control will never
work. This is already alarming,
but the truth is that there is also a
lot of hidden debt in the system
that is not shown in the statistics.
The deficits we referred to do not
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Figure 4Germany, for example, had a deficit of only 3.3 per-
cent in 2010, but if you calculate the increase in its
debt and divide it by GDP, this figure is not 3.3 per-
cent, but 12.8 percent. Why is this figure so large?
Basically as a result of the bad banks that were set up
to rescue the German banking system and because
some so-called toxic assets were taken over by the gov-
ernment in exchange for government bonds. It is
claimed that these toxic assets have the same value as
the government bonds, so they do not contribute to
the deficit. But what happens if these toxic assets have
to be written off upon maturity? Would they show up
in the deficits? No, by the rules of Eurostat they will
never show up in Germany’s recorded deficit, as write-
off losses will only be counted if they occur before
maturity, but no one forces the government to show
these losses prematurely. No rule in Europe that refers
to the deficit criterion, including the German consti-
tutional rule recently adopted, is able to impose any
limit on this sort of operation. 
The next problem is the hidden debt in the social secu-
rity system. Whether a person holds a government
bond and the government has to pay back that bond,
or s/he pays into the social security system and has a
claim against the government, against future genera-
tions, this amounts to the same thing. In economic
terms it is an implicit government debt. How big is this
debt? In Germany the official debt amounted to
83 percent of GDP in 2010 (see Figure 5). The pension
insurance debt as calculated by Raffelhüschen and
Moog is 99 percent. The health insurance debt is even
bigger. So it is an intergenerational transfer. When you
are young and pay into the system, you implicitly build
up a claim against the next gener-
ation to provide medical care for
you without you having to pay for
it in full at that time. This claim is
a government debt for the public
health insurance system. Long-
term care and other obligations of
local governments amount to an
implicit public debt of 251 per-
cent of GDP, as calculated by
Raffelhüschen and Moog (2009)
for Germany. Thus, the country’s
total debt-to-GDP ratio is not
83 percent, but 334 percent. 
The next hidden debt item is the
European Central Bank’s Target
debt. The function of a central
bank is to create money and lend
it to the private sector. During the European crisis, the
peripheral countries borrowed more from their cen-
tral bank than they needed in terms of currency for
circulation in their respective countries. They used the
funds to cover their balance-of-payments deficits. In
the last three years, lots of extra euros were created in
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece and lent to com-
mercial banks, which then lent them to private bor-
rowers who bought goods and/or assets from the
eurozone’s core countries. The extra euros moved to
the core countries, crowding out the money normally
created there by way of giving refinancing credit. It
was not an inflationary exercise, but it meant that part
of the money circulating in Germany originated from
credit in Greece. These cross-border net money flows
are measured by the so-called Target accounts. If
money comes to Germany via this route and the
Bundesbank has to issue this money, because the
Greeks buy goods from Germany, the Bundesbank
does not receive a claim against the banking sector as
is normal when it issues money, but gets instead a
claim against the ECB, and the ECB in turn gets a
claim against the Greek Central Bank. The Bun  -
desbank is effectively granting loans to the Greek
Central bank. In total, the loans granted by the
Bundesbank to other eurozone countries to date
amount to over 320 billion euros. Ireland, Greece,
Portugal and Spain have also taken on liabilities.
Germany’s claims on the ECB amount thus to 326 bil-
lion, while the liabilities of the GIPS countries to the
ECB have soared to 344 billion (see Figures 6 and 7). 
The process was basically a transfer of credit through
the ECB system. If a Greek wants to buy a car, he
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goes to the bank. The bank has no money and can’t
borrow in the European banking market. So what
does it do? It calls the Bundesbank and says, “Please
send some money to Daimler-Benz so it can deliver
the Mercedes”. This is a caricature, but it’s basically
what happened. This is how the Bundesbank’s credit
developed. It was zero before the crisis, because every-
one thought the market would finance any current
account deficits, but the markets were unable to do
this. Since the autumn of 2007 the southern countries
have not only received money through the markets,
but also through the Eurosystem. 
Is the EU a transfer union?
A current account deficit measures that part of the
excess of imports of goods and services over exports
that is not financed by gifts from
other countries or other institu-
tions. So it is the amount of cap-
ital import or external credit a
country needs. Let us take the
current account deficits of the
peripheral countries into consid-
eration. People say that Greece
has to seek shelter under the res-
cue umbrella because the markets
are no longer willing to finance it.
This is wrong! It was not the mar-
kets that have financed Greece
for the past three years; it was the
ECB. And it does not want to
continue doing so. Actually the
ECB cannot continue this sort of
financing without heavy distor-
tions to the balance sheets of the national central
banks. In fact, the stock of refinancing credit under-
lying the German monetary base is shrinking year by
year, and the aggregate stock of refinancing credit in
the non-GIPS countries in Europe amounts to a mere
180 billion euros. If they continue in this fashion for
another two years, this stock of refinancing credit will
be used up. Thereafter, the central banks will have to
sell their gold or borrow funds from the commercial
banks to sterilize the money flowing in from the
periphery. 
This is the reason why the second European rescue
program (ESM) has been introduced: because the
first bail-out system is drying out, at least in terms
of the rules that constitute orderly balance sheets of
the national central banks. As the ECB urged the
eurozone countries to set up
voluminous public credit pro-
grams for the periphery, it effec-
tively paved the way towards a
transfer union. 
This is the story of Europe.
Under the euro, interest conver-
gence meant huge flows of credit
to the southern countries, inflat-
ing their economies and leading
to rapid growth and large current
account deficits. Now these coun-
tries are too expensive and no
longer competitive. That is fine if
someone finances them, but the
market has stopped doing so. The
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Figure 7but is no longer enthusiastic about continuing to pro-
vide credit, to put it mildly. 
The next step will undoubtedly be a European trans-
fer union, because the stock of foreign debt is growing
year by year and is no longer controllable. Given the
parlous state of some countries’ finances, we will have
to give them our money so that they can service their
debt. I firmly believe that, politically, there is no real
exit possibility for Europe. We will definitely go in this
direction. In total, 1,480 billion euros have been com-
mitted to supporting the countries in stress (see
Figure 8). If the worst comes to the worst, Germany
will lose EUR 374 billion, France EUR 280 billion
and Italy EUR 245 billion. Of course, this is an
extreme scenario. A sovereign default will probably
not occur, but what will occur are further rescue oper-
ations: a transfer union to prevent the sovereign
defaults from happening. 
There is no easy way out of this problem. The only
solution for countries in crisis is fiscal consolidation
and real depreciation achieved by cutting wages and
prices so as to become competitive and run current
account surpluses. 
The EEAG has proposed a three-stage crisis mecha-
nism that combines generous liquidity help with a
gradual closing of the credit tap as a country moves
from a liquidity to a solvency crisis. Chancellor
Merkel has emphasised many times that the Greeks
should change their behaviour that they should retire
later and so on. I think this is the false policy
approach. Rather than telling the afflicted countries
what to do, Mrs Merkel should
gradually close the credit tap. If
the money ceases to be available,
the Greeks’ behaviour will
change. Opening the tap, letting
the money flow and then tell the
countries that they cannot use it
is not an effective policy; but that
is essentially what we are doing in
Europe with the ESM and the
Euro Plus Pact.
Some conclusions
As a result of the crisis, the
United States is steadily, though
slowly, moving towards the
European governments’ share in
GDP. This development is actual-
ly useful, because the United States has an underde-
veloped government sector and underdeveloped social
security. It would do better if the country had more
social stability. In difficult times social stability is
especially necessary, and without a state social securi-
ty system, there could even be riots in the United
States. 
We definitely need a new system of banking regula-
tions; but at the same time we need much more flexi-
bility in the labour markets, especially in the southern
European countries. Wages have to be flexible in a
currency union, because within the union there are no
flexible exchange rates. If we now fix wages it will be
a catastrophe. Flexible wages are the only possibility
for the eurozone to survive. Those countries that run
current account deficits must offer cheaper labour in
order to be competitive, and Germany, which has a
current account surplus, has to become more expen-
sive. Fixing the wages at the level of the bursting bub-
ble is a recipe for disaster. 
The ECB’s policy of providing generous refinancing
credit was defensible in the crisis – but the world econ-
omy has recovered in the meantime. What remain to
be solved are the idiosyncratic problems of individual
countries. These problems have to be solved with fis-
cal measures, and not by the ECB. My prediction is
that we are now at a stage in history where we are see-
ing the emergence of a new European state which
basically is a transfer union. I see no other way out. It
is not that I want it. As an economist I strictly distin-
guish between a prediction and a normative state-
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ment. The only possibility that could work would be
the EEAG proposal for a crisis mechanism in Europe.
Last year Chancellor Merkel repeatedly said that we
need a crisis mechanism, an insolvency procedure,
something that makes clear how much money is avail-
able, under what conditions, and to whom it will be
disbursed. But if you read the documents that are now
being prepared by the EU you will see that they are
only about money provisions, with conditionality to
be decided later. Given this situation, there is only one
conclusion to be formed: the money will be used up,
we will continue to throw good money after bad, and
governments will say that we do not have any other
option otherwise the world will fall apart. Thus we
will collect additional money and continually post-
pone the problem until the next government takes
over. Meanwhile the problem will become bigger and
bigger, and the repayment probability smaller and
smaller. In the end there will have to be a debt mora-
torium or, its equivalent, namely an outright transfer
union.
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